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at law

The National Individual
Health Insurance Mandate

(above one thousand dollars annually) and higher taxes (such as hospital
subsidies, Medicaid, and Medicare).
Individuals often delay purchasing insurance until they become ill, creating
an “adverse selection” problem for insurers. At its worst, free-riding and adverse selection create a downward spiral
of higher premiums and a shrinking insurance pool, making everyone’s health
care less affordable.5
The Mandate’s Constitutionality

by Lawrence O. Gostin

O

n March 23, 2010, President
Obama signed into law the
nation’s first comprehensive
health care reform bill, the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act.
Within weeks, twenty states filed lawsuits challenging the constitutionality
of its most politically charged feature—
an individual purchase mandate. By
2014, the bill requires most individuals
to have health insurance. With certain
exceptions (pertaining to income level
and religious objections), individuals
without qualifying coverage will pay an
annual tax penalty reaching the greater
of $695 ($2,085 per family maximum)
or 2.5 percent of household income.1
If anything, the tax penalty is too low
compared with the cost of insurance, so
it may not provide sufficient incentive
for healthy individuals to purchase insurance. But it remains controversial
because it compels people to purchase
coverage they choose not to have, raising the question whether Congress can
lawfully and ethically require individuals to contract with, and transfer money
to, a private party.2 To be sure, the individual mandate lacks a clear American
precedent. (It has worked successfully
in other countries, such as Australia.)
Compulsory automobile insurance, for
example, is a state requirement, operates
as a condition of exercising the privilege
of driving, and requires coverage for injuries to others (not the insured).
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Personal Freedom and Collective
Goods in Conflict

O

pposing a mandate is understandable when viewed from an individual perspective: it interferes with
economic freedom and constrains personal choice. In economic terms, it
represents a compelled cross-subsidy.
However, when viewed from a collective
perspective, the mandate offers valuable
social benefits. The absence of health insurance creates harmful consequences,
including lower quality of life, increased
morbidity and mortality, and higher financial burdens.3
Since these adverse consequences fall
mostly on those who lack insurance,
the decision to seek insurance arguably should be left to them. However,
government is responsible for the wellbeing of the community, not particular
individuals. Even if the decision were
primarily self-regarding, its effects—illness and death—can be felt by all.
Many individuals cannot afford insurance, but others choose not to insure;
over nine million people with annual
incomes over seventy-five thousand dollars had no coverage in 2007.4 Yet many
previously healthy people suffer illness
or injury and end up requiring treatment in emergency departments, most
of which is uncompensated. “Free riders” rely on society to pick up the costs
(forty-three billion dollars in 2008)
through higher insurance premiums

T

he pivotal constitutional concern
is that government will penalize
individuals for failing to buy health
insurance—for “doing nothing”—simply because they are legal residents of
the United States. The states could
undoubtedly mandate health coverage,
as with the Massachusetts Health Care
Reform Plan of 2006. But the federal
government has limited power; its principal enumerated powers are to regulate
interstate commerce and to tax for the
general welfare. The Supreme Court,
however, has broadly construed federal
powers—known as the “implied powers” doctrine—to uphold laws that are
“necessary and proper.” By this reasoning, the Court ought to uphold the
constitutionality of the health insurance
mandate.
The power to regulate interstate commerce. The Supreme Court has interpreted the commerce power broadly,
applying it to virtually every aspect of
economic and social life. Indeed, from
1937 to 1995, the Court did not invalidate a single federal statute on the
ground that Congress lacked the power
to regulate commerce. Critics claim,
however, that the individual mandates
do not regulate activity of any kind,
whether economic or not, but rather
regulate “doing nothing at all.”6 An individual decision not to purchase health
insurance, they argue, also has negligible economic consequences, with purely
personal and intrastate impacts.
Nothing could be farther from the
truth. In terms of health, individuals
never really “do nothing.” Uninsured individuals self-insure, rely on family, and
cost-shift to hospitals, the insured, and
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taxpayers. The cumulative economic effects are vast. Health care captures more
than 17 percent of gross domestic product. Health care professionals, pharmaceuticals, medical equipment, digital
medical records, and insurance claims
routinely move across state lines. The
insurance industry, moreover, clearly
operates within the stream of interstate
commerce: marketing products, offering policies for sale, underwriting, and
reimbursing claims. Low coverage rates
and greater health care costs contribute
to medical bankruptcies, unemployment, and reduced consumer spending
and business competitiveness.
The Supreme Court has upheld
far-reaching federal regulation on the
ground that though individual economic activity may be negligible, collective
consequences can become deeply consequential. In Gonzales v. Raich, the Court
held that the commerce clause empowered Congress to prohibit personal cultivation and use of medical marijuana.
The Court found “striking similarities”
between Raich and a 1942 case upholding a federal prohibition on a farmer
growing wheat for his own use.7 The
Court said that its prior decisions striking down the federal Gun-Free School
Zones Act and the federal Violence
Against Women Act, on the ground
that those laws exceeded congressional
authority, were read “far too broadly.”8
The power to tax. The individual
mandate is enforced though a federal
tax, enabling Congress also to rely on
its enumerated power to raise taxes for
the general welfare. The tax will generate revenues to help support health care
reform. But it will do more than that by
creating incentives to purchase health
insurance.
The Supreme Court, in its early jurisprudence, expressed concern about
federal taxes designed to punish or regulate rather than to raise revenue. Thus,
the Court distinguished between revenue-raising taxes, which it upheld, and
purely regulatory taxes, which it found
constitutionally troubling. The distinction, however, has all but disappeared.
For example, the Court has upheld
federal taxes on concealed firearms and
the medical prescribing of marijuana,
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stating that a “tax does not cease to be
valid because it regulates, discourages,
or even definitely deters the activities
taxed.”9
Today, a federal tax is likely to be
constitutional unless it regulates behavior in a way extraneous to any tax need.
The act’s tax penalty is clearly constitutional because it helps pay the costs of
reform (such as Medicaid expansion,
health insurance subsidies, and state insurance exchanges) and corrects market
failures (such as preexisting condition
exclusions). The mandate, therefore, is
essential for expanding access—the raison d’être of health care reform.
Critics claim the tax penalty simply
avoids the political costs of raising income taxes to pay for social programs.
But the state frequently and appropriately raises revenue for beneficial activities
by taxing risky behaviors like smoking,
drinking alcohol, and gambling. By doing so, the tax pays for a valuable service
while discouraging unhealthy behavior—exactly what Congress intended
with the health insurance mandate.
Why the Mandate Is Vital

T

he state lawsuits are widely expected to reach a conservative-leaning,
business-friendly Supreme Court sometime in 2011. The litigation may falter
on procedural grounds: “ripeness” (the
lawsuits were filed four years before the
mandate takes effect, so plaintiffs cannot demonstrate current injury and can
merely speculate whether they will be
harmed) or “standing” (states have little
stake in federal decisions to mandate individuals to purchase insurance).
If the Court were to reach the merits
and invalidate the mandate, however,
comprehensive health care reform could
unravel. In theory, the mandate could
be severed from the rest of the act’s
two-thousand-plus pages, but the sponsors rightly saw it as integral to reform.
Private insurance companies could not,
and would not, cover high-risk individuals unless they could spread the costs
among a wide pool. And unless young,
healthy people were given incentives to
join the pool, they would opt out. They
opt out now. And with the new ban on

preexisting condition exclusions, they
would have even more reason to delay
buying insurance, as they could simply wait until they become ill. Absent
a mandate, the insurance market would
become highly dysfunctional.
Comprehensive health care reform
envisages a social contract where everyone shares the cost; one that recognizes
all of us may become ill one day. The
mandate is not an unjustified limit on
freedom, but rather is vital to a decent
society. If the social contract must be
accomplished the “American way”—
through the private system—then the
simple logic of insurance has to prevail,
which is to spread the risk among everyone—rich and poor, healthy and sick,
young and old alike. And for that to
happen, the judiciary will have to uphold the individual purchase mandate.
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